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Abstract  
Despite their unprecedented growth, developing countries still face severe problems in the provision of 
collective goods. Electricity, whose provision is scarce or unreliable in most developing regions, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is an emblematic case. The reason for this shortage is not only 
imputable to the lack of effective formal institutions, but also to the inefficacy of informal institutions in 
enabling alternative solutions for the production, transmission and distribution of electricity. In this 
context of “double institutional void”, multinational enterprises (MNEs) can play a decisive role. 
However, we claim that their effectiveness depends on both the formal and informal institutional 
proximity that exists between the country of origin and the destination of the multinational company. 
Our econometric analysis relies on a sample of pairs of home-host countries, the latter of which are all 
from sub-Saharan Africa, observed from 2005 to 2011. Our findings confirm our expectations. 
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 1. Introduction 
The impact of multinational enterprises (MNEs) on host countries, especially developing countries, has 
been widely debated and has generated substantial controversy (e.g., Oetzel and Doh, 2009). On the one 
hand, MNEs promote economic growth by raising domestic savings, transferring technology and 
knowledge, increasing domestic competition and stimulating entrepreneurship (Caves, 1974; Teece, 
1977); on the other hand, MNEs may crowd out local firms, introduce inappropriate technologies, 
constrain potential technology and knowledge spillover, and reduce domestic tax revenues because of 
transfer price and profit manipulation (De Backer and Sleuwagen, 2003; Haddad and Harrison, 1993). 
Such a controversy about the impact of MNEs is not limited to economic performance, as it also  covers  
non-economic dimensions of development, such as environmental and social issues (Abdouli and 
Hammami, 2017; Hubler and Keller, 2010). We aim to join this debate by investigating the role that 
MNEs might play in promoting a specific dimension of development, that is, the access to electricity of  
a local population (see also, D’Amelio et al., 2016; Sesan et al., 2013). Access to electricity has many 
effects, some of which can be considered collective goods2. Indirect impacts such as improved education, 
health, communication and safety, are essential for households, communities, industrial development and 
the functioning of public services (Ahlborg et al., 2015). However, according to the estimates of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 1.3 billion people in developing countries, which is equivalent to 17 
per cent of the global population, had not access to electricity in 2013. Nearly 97 per cent of those people 
live in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and developing Asia (IEA, 2014). This severe shortage of electricity 
access is mainly due to the decline or slowdown in infrastructure investments and maintenance for the 
production, transmission and distribution of electricity in the last half of the twentieth century (Robbins 
and Perkins, 2012)3. 
We analyze the determinants of electricity access, considering  the results of two research traditions, 
namely the transaction cost economics of infrastructure provision (Ostrom et al., 1993; Levy and Spiller, 
1994; Henisz and Zelner, 2001; Henisz, 2002; Spiller, 2013) and the institutional theory of organizations4 
                                                          
2 Collective goods are commodities, functions and services that provide positive externalities to local collectivities and whose 
supply is assured by governments and/or private organizations. These goods are either non-excludable but rival or non-rival 
but excludable, i.e. “impure” public goods (Boddewyn and Doh, 2011). 
3 The reasons for this decline are complex and vary across countries. However, some common features can be identified. 
Namely, the decline of state revenues stemming from the commodity price crisis of the 1970s, political and economic 
instability and   rising debts. These factors have been reinforced by the scarce attention of the Millennium Development Goals 
to the importance of the electricity infrastructure in meeting development targets (Robbins and Perkins, 2012). 
4 We are aware that the societal role of MNEs can be studied adopting different theoretical lens (see Forsgren, 2017). However, 
echoing Forsgren (pp. 144), “the (institutionalization) theory is quite mixed from a societal point of view. One strand within 
the theory emphasizes the/a multinational firm’s tendency to adapt to external institutions in terms of rules, norms and values. 
 (for a recent literature review with specific reference to emerging countries, see Rottig, 2016). While 
transaction cost studies have highlighted that well-functioning formal and informal institutions are 
necessary to remedy market and governmental failures in the infrastructure sectors, institutional theorists 
have emphasized that the social environment and its formal and informal “rules of the game” affect an 
organization’s structure and actions. Formal institutions are rules that are observable through written 
documents, or rules that are determined and executed through formal positions, such as authority or 
ownership. They include juridical rules, explicit incentives, contractual terms and economic 
rules/property rights (North, 1990). Informal institutions are non-codified systems of shared values and 
collective understanding, which shape cohesion and coordination among individuals in a society (Holmes 
et al., 2013; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Electricity shortage could stem from the failure of formal institutions to ensure that governments provide 
electricity infrastructures or regulate private utilities (Gillanders, 2014; Henisz, 2002; Levy and Spiller, 
1994). It could also arise from the inability of informal institutions to promote self-organized collective 
actions, i.e. cooperatives and non-profit organizations (NGOs) that develop and operate decentralized 
systems for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity (Hansmann, 1996; Ostrom et al., 
1993; Teegen, 2003). However, we argue that when both formal and informal institutions fail to develop 
lasting solutions for the provision of electricity to a local population, MNEs may actively participate in 
the development, maintenance and operation of an electricity infrastructure, alone or in partnership with 
for-profit local organizations or NGOs (Boddewyn and Doh, 2011). Both market and non-market 
strategies are behind the engagement of MNEs in electricity provision. Electricity provision is the core 
mission of foreign utilities that enter liberalized local markets by leveraging resources and competences 
that have cumulated in their home countries and on international markets (Mbalyohere et al., 2017). 
Secondly, MNEs from energy-intensive industries have traditionally invested in generation and 
transmission infrastructures to grant a reliable and cost-effective supply for their own operations. Mining 
companies are a quintessential example of this market strategy (Banerjee et al. 2014, pp. 43-55). In fact, 
some of them are abandoning the traditional “enclave” approach and are cooperating with local 
                                                          
In that sense, it has a quite passive or reactive role. But […] other themes in the theory emphasize that multinational firms 
can have a much more proactive role vis-à-vis society. These themes leave room for the idea that powerful multinationals can 
shape the environment in such a way that they maximize their own short-term profits instead of being beneficial for society 
in the long- run. The outcome hinges on the power balance between the multinational firm and the surrounding society.” Thus, 
as we are dealing with the role of institutions on the one hand, and the MNEs’ search for legitimacy through market and non-
market strategies, on the other, we believe our context is particularly appropriate to understand the “balance between the 
multinational firm and the surrounding society”. We are particularly grateful to an anonymous Referee who stimulated us to 
better justify our choice. 
 
 governments to provide electricity infrastructures that serve both their operations and local users 
(Robbins and Perkins, 2012; Toledano, 2012; Banerjee et al. 2014, pp. 57-80). Finally, the activism of 
MNEs in electricity provision functions as a non-market strategy, because promoting the local 
population’s access to electricity is mainly a means of gaining legitimacy with local stakeholders, thus 
raising the likelihood of success in their own core businesses (Holburn and Zelner, 2010).  
We also acknowledge that when analyzing the role of MNEs in foreign countries, it is important to take 
into account the institutional environment of their country of origin, namely the institutional proximity 
between the MNE’s home and host country. In fact, managers’ competences depend on their specific 
formal and informal institutional setting (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999); thus, we expect that the MNEs that 
are more effective in developing electricity infrastructure and raising access to electricity will be those 
from countries that are institutionally closer to the host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008).  
In this paper, we focus on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), as this is one of the regions in the world which, 
according to UNCTAD data, has experienced the greatest increase in the presence of MNEs over the last 
decade, namely a 120 per cent increase in inward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from 2005 to 
2014. In fact, a stable economic growth, a burgeoning middle class, an increasing purchasing power and 
a youthful population has led Ernest and Young to rank SSA as the second most attractive region in the 
world in 2014 (E&Y, 2014). Nevertheless, the same region, with 68 per cent of the population (i.e., 634 
million people) without access to electricity, has the lowest access to electricity rate in the world (IEA, 
2014). In this context, MNEs can clearly play a role in stimulating the long-term development of the 
region. 
In order to test how the impact of MNEs on the access to electricity is moderated by the quality of 
institutions, we adopt the infrastructure deployment model that Henisz and Zelner (2001) used to study 
the institutional determinants of telecommunication infrastructures. The results, obtained by means of 
panel data techniques, confirm that FDI and MNEs can raise the access to electricity of a local population, 
depending on both the formal and informal institutions of the country of origin and the destination of the 
investment. In other words, in countries where not only formal but also informal institutions are weak, 
MNEs can be a viable tool to raise the access to electricity of the local population. This is more likely to 
be the case when the MNEs come from countries that are also weak in their informal institutional settings.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of MNEs on developing countries and the role of 
(formal and informal) institutions therein, by focusing on an important prerequisite for development – 
namely, the provision of electricity.  
 This article is organized as follows. Our conceptual framework is presented in section 2. Section 3 
illustrates the data and the variables employed in our empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the model 
adopted to test our hypotheses. Sections 5 and 6 present the results and robustness checks, respectively. 
Finally, section 7 concludes/introduces our conclusions. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework – The role of institutions and MNEs in the provision of electricity 
The provision of infrastructures and other collective goods has been widely investigated through 
conceptual frameworks that combine transaction cost economics with a thorough analysis of institutions 
across different geographic contexts (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1993; Levy and Spiller, 1994; Henisz and Zelner, 
2001; Henisz, 2002; Spiller, 2013). 
Infrastructure assets are highly specific and not re-deployable; they enjoy important economies of scale 
and scope, and have a broad range of domestic users (Levy and Spiller, 1994). The combination of these 
features generates transaction costs and makes infrastructures highly vulnerable to expropriation risks, 
unless the hold-up problem is alleviated through appropriate formal institutions (Levy and Spiller, 1994; 
Henisz, 2002). If formal institutions are well-designed and protected, the State manages to provide or to 
regulate electricity infrastructures. However, another body of transaction cost economics studies 
emphasizes that centralized institutional arrangements are unlikely to efficiently coordinate  the multiple 
independent actions that are necessary to develop, maintain and operate infrastructures (Ostrom, 1990, 
pp. 38-39), in part because they rarely adapt to specific local circumstances and needs (Ostrom et al., 
1993, pp. 141-156).  More generally, in developing countries, the functioning of formal institutions can 
suffer to various degrees when the judicial system is inefficient, regulation is misguided and information 
is not reliable, thus generating, what -Khanna and Palepu (1997) called, formal institutional voids. When 
this is the case, national governments are likely to be ineffective in providing and/or regulating electricity 
infrastructures.  
In a context of formal institutional voids, informal institutions can play a crucial role in supporting the 
provision of collective goods (Teegen, 2003). In fact, informal institutions may be seen as enabling 
conditions and, especially in emerging and developing markets, have become crucial for economic 
activity, compared to formal institutions that drive economic activity on developed markets (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2010). In the electricity sector, the existence of informal institutions may enable self-organized 
collective actions, namely NGOs or electricity cooperatives, which are owned and managed by a group 
of consumers or by local communities, and often supplant State-owned and/or regulated utilities (Ostrom 
 et al., 1993; Hansmann, 1996), owing to reasons that have been explained by the theorists of informal 
institutions. 
Informal institutions emerge in response to repeatedly encountered social and/or economic problems, 
and they mirror the social capital of the country, understood as the “goodwill available to individuals or 
groups, whose source lies in the structure and content of the actor’s social relations” (Adler and Kwon, 
2002: 23). A higher social capital corresponds to stronger links among individuals and/or groups, thus 
lowering transaction costs, favoring cohesiveness and facilitating the pursuit of collective goals 
(Sandefyr and Laumann, 1998). Thus, informal institutions are related to the social structure, namely the 
level of trust and collectivism among the individuals or groups that compose a society (Leana and Van 
Buren, 1999; London and Hart, 2004). Trust is a “generalized expectancy held by an individual that the 
word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon” (Rotter, 
1980:1). In economic terms, trust is a mechanism that mitigates (against) the risk of opportunistic 
behavior among those engaged in various types of economic transactions (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). For 
this reason, trust represents itself as a key motivational source of social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
On the other hand, collectivism, defined as the willingness and ability of individuals to define collective 
goals that are enacted collectively, is essential for the generation of social capital (Leana and Van Buren 
1999). 
This implies that collectivist and trust-based societies, where community members trust each other and 
act on the basis of group rationality rather than individual rationality, are more likely to self-organize and 
to be successful in the provision of collective goods (Holmes et al., 2013; Teegen, 2003).  
However, whether a common action can be effectively organized internally by communities, namely by 
citizens’ self-governed associations, is highly contingent to the social setting (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 55-57). 
Moreover, informal institutions may be poorly developed, and when this is the case, the country 
experiences an informal institutional void. 
Table 1 anticipates the available arrangements to provide electricity under different combinations of 
formal and informal institutions. The infrastructure/infrastructural concepts include national grids that 
connect large production nodes to regions and large consumption areas over long distances, mini grids 
that connect consumers belonging to smaller local communities to local production plants, and off-grid 
systems that ensure autonomy of the end-users (IEA, 2014; Banerjee et al. 2014, pp. 43-55). National 
grids cannot be deployed and managed by decentralized players of a local nature, such as NGOs and 
cooperatives. However, those organizations that engage local consumers and other local players have an 
advantage in adapting mini and off-grid systems to local needs and circumstances.  
 In situations in which both formal and informal institutions are strong (North-West cell in Table 1), both 
State-owned or regulated utilities and NGOs or cooperatives can develop and operate electricity 
infrastructures of different kinds. The North-East and South-West cells in  Table 1 represent situations 
in which strong formal institutions balance weak informal institutions and vice versa. Strong formal 
institutions are sufficient to ensure that State-owned or regulated utilities provide electricity, mainly 
through national or mini grids. On the other hand, stronger informal institutions promote the formation 
of NGOs and cooperatives that mainly supply electricity through off- and mini-grid systems. Finally, in 
a context of double institutional void (South-East cell in Table 1), arrangements such as State ownership, 
regulation, NGOs or cooperatives are unlikely to be effective, and MNEs can emerge as important actors 
in electricity provision, according to an emerging body of research.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Other studies (e.g., D’Amelio et al., 2016) have already shown that when formal institutions are weak, 
MNEs actively participate in the development of infrastructures for the provision of electricity to the 
local population. We claim that this is even more the case when the informal institutions are also weak, 
that is, where no other body is in place to provide electricity on the local market.  
In fact, the engagement of MNEs with electricity infrastructure may be related to the company’s market 
or non-market strategies  (Doh et al., 2012). MNEs may develop electricity infrastructure as part of their 
core product/service (Mbalyohere et al., 2017)5. In other industries, electricity operation is part of the 
chain of activities necessary to supply the product; e.g. manufacturing and mining companies may engage 
in electricity infrastructures because they need energy to run their business activities (Robbins and 
Perkins, 2012; Toledano, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2014). On the other hand, MNEs could supplement 
governmental and non-governmental activities in the provision of electricity infrastructures as part of 
their non-market strategies. Corporate social responsibility and corporate political activities are 
instrumental in gaining the legitimacy that is necessary to countervail the liabilities of being a foreign as 
well as a profit-driven company6. By providing electricity to the local population, MNEs internalize 
                                                          
5 An example is the Electricité de France Group (EDF), a global leader in the power sector, which signed several agreements 
with national governments and other MNEs to cooperate in the improvement of the electrification rate in several sub-Saharan 
countries, such as Botswana, Mali, South Africa and Senegal. This has been done through the development of on-grid and 
mini-grid systems. 
6 An example is AngloGold Ashanti, a South African multinational mining company that operates in Guinea and which, as a 
result of villagers’ protests in 2012, built an electric power line from one of its mining plants to the nearby town, in order to 
gain legitimacy with the villagers and guarantee their business activities (Toledano, 2012). 
 societal failure and show commitment toward the country in which they are investing, thus gaining 
legitimacy with local stakeholders, e.g., civil society, politicians and local representatives (Holburn and 
Zelner, 2010; Buckley and Boddewyn, 2014). In fact, legitimatization with local stakeholders is 
fundamental to increase the chances of survival and success of foreign firms on the host market 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
Accordingly, our first hypothesis states as follows: 
 
H1. In developing countries, MNEs raise (the) access to electricity when both the formal and informal 
host country institutions are weak. 
 
However, the institutional theory suggests that MNEs must conform to the rules and requirements of the 
local social environments in which they operate in order to be perceived as legitimate (Rosenzweig and 
Singh, 1991; Westney, 1993). In fact, organizations that do not conform to the rules, values and beliefs 
lose the support of, and acceptance by, the surrounding society in which they are embedded (Scott, 2014).  
Hence, unless MNEs understand and correctly interpret the formal regulatory and informal normative 
and cultural rules of a foreign institutional environment, they are unlikely to succeed on that market 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Scott, 2014).  
The effectiveness of MNEs in compensating the inability of host country institutions to provide 
electricity is influenced to a great extent by the proximity between the formal institutional context of the 
country of origin of the MNE and the institutional environment of the host country (D’Amelio et al., 
2016). When this is the case, the MNE managers have already developed, at home, the capability to deal 
with weak formal institutions and are more effective in identifying key actors to form winning coalitions 
in the host country (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Holburn and Zelner, 2010). However, literature 
has so far mainly focused on the formal institutional setting, and on (the) formal institutional proximity. 
We argue that the same holds for informal institutions. In fact, managers from individualist and unreliable 
countries are already familiar with the inability of local communities and NGOs to compensate for the 
weakness of national governments in implementing sound and lasting actions for the provision of 
electricity to local populations. For this reason, compared with MNEs from countries with strong 
informal institutions, MNEs from informal and institutionally weak countries are more likely to have 
already developed in-house alternative solutions for the provision of electricity to the population of the 
countries where they operate. Moreover, MNEs (coming) from institutionally similar countries are likely 
 to find it easier to adapt to the unique institutional environments of developing countries (Rottig, 2016). 
Accordingly, our second hypothesis states as follows. 
 
H2. In developing countries affected by formal and informal institutional voids, MNEs are more effective 
in raising access to electricity if they come from a  similar country, not only as far as  the formal  
institutional environment is concerned, but also the informal one. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1) Sample 
Our sample is composed of pairs of home-host countries, the latter of which are all from SSA, observed 
from 2005 to 2011. Our dataset has been obtained from the merging of four different databases. The 
access to electricity rate has been sourced from the World Energy Outlook of the IEA. The formal 
institutional quality has been measured considering the six Worldwide Governance Indicators of the 
World Bank. The quality of informal institutions has been proxied by the degree of institutional 
collectivism (Source: GLOBE project) and interpersonal trust (Source: World Value Survey). Finally, 
the MNEs’ presence has been measured by means of bilateral FDI directed to SSA, disaggregated 
according to the country of origin and the destination of the investment (Source: UNCTAD).  
We adopted multiple imputation techniques to overcome the problem of missing data, especially for the 
variables that measure the access to electricity for local populations and inward FDI), (Allison, 2001)7, 
and this has led to a final balanced sample of 1,547 observations. Table 2 reports the list of the 15 host 
countries and 73 home countries contained in the sample. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3.2) Dependent Variable 
Access to Electricity Growth. The access to electricity rate has been sourced from the World Energy 
Outlook of the IEA. In other words, our dependent variable represents the annual growth of the 
percentage of households with access to electricity (Source: IEA). According to the definition provided 
by IEA, access to electricity comprises consumption of a minimum level of electricity, set equal to 250 
                                                          
7 With multiple imputation, missing values are drawn from a distribution of observed variables, including the variables at 
stake. Multiple imputation does not entail interpolation from contiguous values. Instead, it is generated by chained equations, 
an option that is suitable to deal with a high proportion of missing data (Allison, 2001). Finally, in order to guarantee the 
consistency of the imputed data, we removed all the paired countries with less than 3 observations per variable over the 7 
years. 
 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per year for rural households and to 500 kWh per year for urban households (IEA, 
2014). This variable includes infrastructural and non-infrastructural solutions for the provision of 
electricity (e.g., diesel generators) and mainly refers to the supply side of electricity access. Thus, we 
have included control variables that capture the determinants of the electricity demand (e.g., a country’s 
economic structure or income level) and obstacles to the development of electricity infrastructures (e.g., 
the percentage of rural population and population density). 
Table 3 shows the data on the access to electricity from 2005 to 2011 in the host countries of our sample. 
Overall, the access to electricity increased in all sub-Saharan countries, with peaks in Namibia (+26%), 
Angola and Ghana (both +23%). The countries with the highest rate of access to electricity in 2011 are 
Mauritius (99%) and South Africa (85%); the most problematic countries are Congo the Democratic 
Republic (9%), Uganda (15%) and Kenya (19%).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3.3) Explanatory variables 
FDI per capita. Bilateral inward FDI stocks disaggregated according to the home and host country have 
been adopted to measure the presence of MNEs (Source: UNCTAD). Since inward FDI stock is an 
extensive variable, which varies according to the country’s size, and our dependent variable is expressed 
as a percentage of population, the bilateral FDI per capita has been employed8.  
Table 4 shows the distribution of the FDI per capita according to the region of origin. The European 
Union appears to be the main investor (28% of the total FDI per capita), and this is followed by North 
America (19%), South-East Asia (15%) and SSA (11%). The Chinese FDI ranks sixth, with a total 
amount of $19k per capita (7% of the total FDI per capita)9. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
Formal Institutional Void. The formal institutional void in a host country is measured considering the 
six World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) on a yearly basis, namely regulatory 
quality, control of corruption, voice and accountability, rule of law, governance effectiveness and 
political stability, and absence of violence and terrorism. We have chosen these indicators as they are 
good proxies of the four institutional mechanisms which, according to Bergara et al. (1998), are necessary 
                                                          
8 As per access to electricity, this variable was also affected by missing data (26%) which were treated with multiple 
imputation techniques (Allison, 2001). 
9 A possible explanation for the small amount of Chinese FDI could be that Chinese companies rely heavily on government 
sponsored projects, and this makes the distinction between FDI and official assistance ambiguous. For instance, investments 
by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can be included in the definition of official flows of development assistance if 
they receive subsidized state financing of the export credits (WB, 2015).   
 to guarantee the feasibility of infrastructure investment (for details see Appendix A.1).  However, as 
there is not a univocal correspondence between the WGIs and these four mechanisms, all (the) six WGIs 
have been considered. In addition, due to the high correlation among these indicators (coefficient > 0.7 
and p<0.01) and in line with the previous literature (e.g., Farla et al., 2016), a factorial analysis has been 
performed, and this has led to a unique indicator of the degree of formal institutional void of a host 
country, as shown in Table 5. This variable has a high value when the host country is affected by a severe 
formal institutional void and a low value for a higher quality of formal institutions. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Informal Institutional Void. As illustrated in Section 2, a country’s social capital is a major component 
of local informal institutions. Social capital is weaker where the degree of individualism and distrust is 
higher. For this reason, two variables have been used to measure the void of informal institutions in the/a 
host country: institutional collectivism, sourced from the Global Leadership and Organisational 
Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) project, and the degree of interpersonal trust, sourced from the World 
Value Survey (WVS).  
Institutional collectivism reflects “the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices 
encourage and reward the collective distribution of resources and collective action” (House et al., 2004: 
30). High institutional collectivism corresponds to a low level of informal institutional voids, while low 
collectivism reveals high informal institutional voids. 
The degree of interpersonal trust in a society explains why actors tend to cooperate in some settings but 
do not cooperate in other settings (Cox et al., 2009; Ostrom et al., 1993). A high level of interpersonal 
trust corresponds to a low level of informal institutional voids, while low trust reveals high informal 
institutional voids. 
Both variables are time invariant, since the relevant databases are not updated yearly. Institutional 
collectivism has been observed for 2004, while interpersonal trust has been observed for the 2005-’09 
period, with different years for different countries. In principle, trust and collectivism could exhibit some 
degree of longitudinal variance in the panel time window. However, we are confident that the underlying 
variations are small, because informal institutions are endogenous to indigenous societies, a fact that 
makes them evolve slowly (Boettke et al., 2008).  
Formal and Informal Institutional Proximity. Using the same procedures and sources presented above, 
we have also measured the degree of formal and informal institutional voids for the home countries. We 
have then measured the dyadic distance between the level of institutional void in the home and host 
countries by means of the Mahalanobis method, which is a better choice than the more traditional 
 Euclidean method, as it is scale invariant and takes into consideration the variance–covariance matrix 
(Berry et al., 2010).  Finally, we have inverted the measures of institutional distance, thus obtaining the 
level of institutional proximity between the home and host countries, for both formal and informal 
institutions. 
 
3.4) Control Variables 
The statistical analysis includes a number of control variables.  
First, the growth in the access to electricity rate is largely dependent on economic resources (Ahlborg et 
al., 2015). Thus, we have introduced two dummies, that is, low-income country (LIC) and lower middle-
income country (LMIC), to control for the income level of the host country. The upper middle-income 
country (UMIC) dummy represents the baseline. The classification comes from the World Bank and was 
built, on a yearly basis, using the nominal gross national income (GNI) per capita indicator10. 
In addition, in order to control for the host country’s economic structure and to mitigate the lack of 
information about  the inward FDI sector,  industry and service value added variables, both of which are 
expressed as  percentages of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Source: World Bank’s Development 
Indicators), have been included. In other words, industry value added covers mining, manufacturing, 
construction, electricity, water and gas,  while service value added comprises wholesale and retail trade 
(including hotels and restaurants), transport, government, financial, professional and personal services, 
such as education, health care and real estate services. The two variables take on a low value if the country 
is specialized in agriculture, husbandry, forestry and fishing.   
Since, ceteris paribus, it is more difficult to increase access to electricity when a population lives in a 
rural area, we have included Rural population, which is measured considering the annual percentage of 
a population living in a rural area, and Population density, which is measured considering the number of 
people per square kilometer of land area. Both variables have been sourced from the World Bank’s 
Development Indicators.  
Furthermore, as electrification shows scale effects, we have controlled for the size of the country, 
expressed in millions of people (Source: World Bank’s Development Indicators).  
Finally, time and country pair dummies have been added in order to capture time varying macroeconomic 
shocks and unobservable country pair specific factors. 
 
                                                          
10 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups accessed on 15 June 2016. 
 3.5) Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the model variables. The overall pattern 
does not reveal any multi-collinearity. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In the host countries considered in the sample, the mean of the access to electricity is 59 per cent and 
varies from 6 to 99 per cent. FDI per capita has a large variance (standard error equal to 1496), thus 
reinforcing what had already emerged in Table 3: the FDI are not uniformly distributed over the host 
countries of the sample. Formal institutional void varies from 0 to 4, with a small standard deviation, 
equal to 1. On the contrary, the Degree of collectivism varies from 0 to 1, while the Degree of distrust 
varies from 0 to 2529. It is interesting to note that rich and urbanized countries are more individualist, 
but show a higher degree of interpersonal trust. In addition, in order to have a high degree of institutional 
collectivism, formal institutions have to be strong, but this leads to a lower level of interpersonal trust. 
Finally, it emerges that LIC, which are characterized by low domestic saving rates and tax revenues, are 
particularly sensitive to the urbanization rate. 
 
4. Methodology 
In order to analyze the determinants of electricity provision to local population, we have utilized a growth 
model that links infrastructure deployment to institutions (Henisz and Zelner, 2001). Equation (1) 
represents our baseline. (1)     ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1                            + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 +              + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖 + 
          + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  
          + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖            + 𝛾𝛾 𝑍𝑍′𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′  +  𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡                         
where i is the host country, j is the home country, t is the year, φt  and χji are  the unobservable year and 
country-pair fixed effects, respectively; εij,t is the i.i.d. disturbance term. ΔAccess to electricityi,t is the 
difference in the access to electricity rate between t and t-1 for host country i.  Access to electricityi,t.1 is 
the lagged dependent variable in level. Equation (1) is a reduced form specification of the dynamic 
investment model (see Bond and Van Reenen, 2007), since the growth of access rate is a proxy of 
investment, and the lagged access rate is a proxy of the installed capital stock. The equivalent model in 
which the dependent variable is the access rate in level can easily be obtained by adding the/a lagged 
 dependent variable, i.e. Access to electricityi,t.1, to both sides of the equation  and re-parametrizing its 
coefficient into 1 +  𝛼𝛼1.   
The explanatory variables are FDI per capita i,j,t.1, Formal Institutional Voidi, and Informal Institutional 
Voidi,. They are included in the level and in the cross products. The estimates of the  𝛽𝛽1  …  𝛽𝛽5 coefficients 
are the main inputs of the short-run marginal effects of the FDI and institutions (see Section 5). 
Specification (1) is potentially able to capture long-run dynamics in the relationships between FDI, 
institutions and access to electricity, thanks to the presence of the lagged dependent variable. We have 
adopted a one-lag model specification to preserve the maximum possible number of degrees of freedom 
available for the estimates, but the long-term effects can be obtained by dividing the short-term effects 
by −𝛼𝛼1 (see also Garrone and Grilli, 2010). 
Z’i,t-1 is the control vector  (population, rural population, population density, and industry and service 
value added), lagged by one period ,while D’i,t  is the vector of the LIC and LMIC dummies.  
Equation (1) was then extended by introducing, one by one, formal and informal institutional proximity, 
respectively, both linearly and interacting with FDI per capita, as shown in Equation (2).  (2)     ∆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1                            + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 +              + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖 + 
          + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  
          + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖            + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 +   
          + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1            + 𝛾𝛾 𝑍𝑍′𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′  +  𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜒𝜒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  
According to the literature on dynamic panel data, we have used the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
Generalized Method of Moments estimator (system GMM) (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). The two-step method has been selected as it is asymptotically more efficient than the one-
step method (Baltagi, 2005), and the bias in the standard errors was fixed by means of Windmeijer’s 
(2005) correction procedure. We have controlled for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, 
the country’s economic structure, the country’s income level, FDI per capita, and the level of formal and 
informal  institutional voids of the host country,  Furthermore, some external instruments have been 
added and treated as predetermined variables, for example, the degree of a country’s globalization; the 
 level of human capital; the internal ethnic and religious tensions, and other dimensions of economic 
development not included in the  multi-collinearity problem model11.  
Finally, before computing our estimates, we ran a reverse causality analysis (using the baseline presented 
in Equation (1)) to rule out the possibility of the presence of an electricity infrastructure attracting FDI, 
and not the other way around. The results confirm that causality runs from inward FDI to access to 
electricity growth12. 
 
5. Results 
Table 7 shows our estimates. In Models (1), (2) and (3), informal institutional void has been measured 
by the degree of institutional individualism, while in Models (4), (5) and (6), informal institutional void 
has been measured by the degree of distrust. Models (1) and (4) represent the baseline, where we have 
tested the impact of FDI per capita on the access to electricity growth, on the basis of the degree of formal 
and informal institutional voids in the host country.  We have added formal institutional proximity, in 
level and interacted with FDI per capita, respectively, to Models (2) and (5). Likewise, we have added 
informal institutional proximity, both in level and interacted with the FDI per capita, to Models (3) and 
(6). 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The lagged dependent variable in level is negative and significant in all the models, meaning that the 
higher the electrification rate at time t-1, the lower the growth rate of the access to electricity at time t.  
All the control variables show a steady and significant sign across all the models. In other words, the 
country size (population) and the population density contribute positively to the access to electricity 
growth, while a high rate of rural population curtails it (p<0.01). This confirms that an increase in the 
access to electricity rate mainly occurs through the development of an electricity infrastructure, which is 
characterized by economies of scale and density. The LIC dummy variable  is negative and significant 
(p<0.01), possibly because an important part of the economy of these countries is represented by the 
mining sector, which leads to limited benefits for the local population in terms of access to electricity 
                                                          
11 The level of a country’s globalization has been proxied with the KOF index of globalization introduced by Dreher (2006). 
The level of human capital has been measured by the human flight and brain drain variable (Source: Fund for Peace). The 
internal tensions have been represented by the group grievance variable (Source: Fund for Peace). Finally, economic 
development has been expressed by the poverty and economic decline variable that aggregates dimensions such as 
unemployment, youth unemployment, economic deficit, government depth, inflation, purchasing power and GDP growth 
(Source: Fund for Peace). 
12  The results of the reverse causality analysis have not been reported for the sake of space; however, they are available upon 
request. 
 (WB, 2015). In fact, a recent study of the World Bank on more than four hundred mining projects in the 
SSA has shown that mining companies often use their own generators or source electricity from the 
national grid, while only rarely do they sell excess power to the grid or electrify the neighboring rural 
population (WB, 2015)13. For this reason, the negative effect is not that surprising. Finally, as expected, 
a higher level of service value added increases the growth of the access to the electricity rate, while 
industry value added is not significant. 
The estimates in Table 7 confirm that countries void of effective institutions experience a slower growth 
in access to electricity (D’Amelio et al., 2016). However, the effect of individual institutional 
components appears to depend on the specifications adopted. We find that a high degree of individualism 
negatively affects the growth of the access to electricity, while the degree of distrust alone is not 
significant. This suggests that societies in which community members show a cooperative behavior are 
more likely to enable electricity cooperatives and NGOs that are effective in the provision of electricity. 
In fact, high collectivism reduces the costs of monitoring the actions of each other, and the probability 
of free riding (Ostrom, 2000). After controlling for the degree of individualism, it is possible to state that 
formal institutions are unlikely to play a significant role by themselves. On the contrary, interpersonal 
trust alone is not a sine qua non precondition for the success of informal institutions in creating alternative 
solutions for an increase in access to electricity for a local population. After controlling for trust, it has 
been found that formal institutions appear to drive electricity provision.  Although FDI per capita does 
not affect our dependent variable in Model (1), it becomes positive and statistically significant when 
interacted with formal and informal institutional voids.  
In order to better gage the moderating role of the formal and informal institutional voids of a host country, 
it is necessary to calculate the marginal effects. Therefore, we have estimated the marginal effects of FDI 
per capita on ΔAccess to electricity through the following formula.  ∂(∆Access to electricityi.t)
∂�FDI per capitai,j,t−1� � = 𝛽𝛽1 +  𝛽𝛽4(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
 
The estimates of marginal effects are reported in Table 8, and they show that FDI stimulates the growth 
of the access to electricity of  a local population when the host countries suffer from a double institutional 
void, i.e. both formal and informal institutions are weak (magnitude of 0.02 and p<0.05). This confirms 
our first hypothesis. 
                                                          
13 See https://databox.worldbank.org/Extractives/Africa_PowerMining_Projects_Database/ez5p-5pcx; accessed on 11 June 
2016. 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
We have introduced formal and informal institutional proximity, and the interactions with FDI per capita 
to Models (2), (3), (5) and (6) in Table 6. Even in this case, marginal effects are needed to interpret the 
role of host institutions and institutional proximity between the host and home countries. Namely:  ∂(∆Access to electricityi.t)
∂�FDI per capitai,j,t−1� � = 
𝛽𝛽1 +  𝛽𝛽4(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 +  𝛽𝛽5(𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  +  𝛽𝛽6(𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
 
The results are reported in Table 8, and they show that the FDI in host countries affected by both formal 
and informal institutional voids only increase (the) access to electricity if it comes from countries that 
are close in both the formal and informal institutional environments of the host countries. This confirms 
our second hypothesis. However, our findings reveal that it is much more important to come from 
countries with a similar degree of interpersonal trust (magnitude of 71 and p<0.05) than from countries 
with a similar degree of institutional collectivism (magnitude of 0.02 and p<0.05). 
 
6. Robustness test 
In order to test the goodness of our results, we ran our model using an alternative measurement of the 
quality of informal institutions:  Hofstede’s individualism versus collectivism (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
This variable has a high value when the society is considered individualist, which means that individuals 
are expected to only take care of themselves and their immediate families.  This variable instead has a 
low value when the society is collectivist, which means that individuals can expect their relatives or 
members of a particular group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.  
The estimates and computed marginal effects are shown in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. The results are 
in line with those obtained with the other two dimensions of institutional voids, especially with the degree 
of institutional collectivism sourced from the GLOBE project. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
7.1. Summary of findings 
In this paper, we have added to the literature on the impact of FDI and MNEs on host country 
development. We have focused on a specific dimension of development, namely  access to electricity, 
and we have analyzed the phenomenon through an  institutional theory lens (North, 1990; Ostrom, 2000), 
 arguing that low rates of access to electricity are  mainly derived from the weakness of institutions, and 
that both formal and informal institutions should be taken into consideration. 
We have in particular studied whether and to what extent, in a context of formal and informal institutional 
void, MNEs can alleviate the shortage of access to electricity of the host country. In doing so, we have 
taken into consideration the institutional framework not only of the country of destination of the MNEs, 
but also of the country of origin,  on the basis of the literature on the  competitive advantage of firms in 
developing countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). We have focused on 
SSA, a region that in the past 10 years has witnessed an increasing presence of MNEs, but where only a 
small proportion of the population has access to electricity.  
Our empirical findings, obtained with panel data techniques, reveal that MNEs in developing countries 
affected by formal and informal institutional voids can raise the access to electricity of the local 
populations. However, this is only true when they come from countries that are similar as far as both the 
formal and informal institutional environments are concerned. The competitive advantage that stems 
from (the) similarity in the institutional setting is stronger when informal institutions are also taken into 
account. MNEs from unreliable societies (i.e., where the level of trust between individuals is low) are in 
particular able to deal with the lack of strong informal institutions and have a greater impact on the 
electrification of the developing countries where they invest. 
 
7.2. Managerial and policy implications 
This paper also introduces important managerial and policy implications for both the governments and 
MNE managers of developing countries. As far as policy implications are concerned, our results suggest 
that FDI attraction polices should take into account both formal and informal institutional proximity with 
the home countries of the MNEs, as these conditions seem to foster the energy development of host 
countries (thus paving the way to the long-term and inclusive development of their countries). 
Likewise, as far as managerial implications are concerned, those MNEs that are looking for legitimacy 
in foreign countries should be aware of the role of institutional proximity when undertaking partnerships 
with local governments and/or local cooperatives and NGOs. Our results also suggest, to MNEs’ 
managers, which dimensions of informal institutions might be more effective to gain legitimacy in a 
foreign country, in order to succeed in aligning their business considerations and their social engagement 
with societal benefits (Nachum, 2017). 
 
7.3. Limitations 
 Although the results of our empirical analysis appear quite robust across the specifications, we are 
aware that we had to deal with missing data through multiple imputation techniques in order to make 
the sample statistically acceptable. Moreover, the quality of formal and informal institutions in host 
countries may influence the decisions of MNEs to expand, renew and operate electricity infrastructures 
through multiple market, social and organizational mechanisms. Our panel data model has allowed us 
to tackle the relationship between electricity access and institutional voids and institutional proximity, 
and to gage its significance, more than to understand how the effects of institutions occur. We believe 
that qualitative research, e.g. a multiple case study, would now be necessary to answer the “how” 
question and to learn about the organizational and social processes through which MNEs improve 
access to electricity for the/a local population.  
 
7.4. Directions for future research 
Our conclusions can be considered important, not only because we have emphasized the role of informal 
institutions and the related informal institutionally proximity as moderating factors in the relationship 
between MNEs and local development, but also in terms of their impact on  research that focuses  on 
emerging markets and under-researched “frontier markets”, like those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
We have discussed how MNEs may foster  access to energy in a local context, as a result of both market 
and non-market strategies, although MNEs currently invest in developing countries for different reasons, 
that is, from purely resource-seeking reasons to knowledge-seeking reasons, especially in search of 
bottom-of-the-pyramid innovations (Chikhouni et al., 2017). These emerging motivations for 
internationalization may lead to a different balance between market and non-market strategies, and to a 
different involvement (and, consequently, impact) of MNEs within the local context. 
We also believe that future research opportunities exist to investigate the role of MNEs in fostering local 
development, by adopting a firm-level analysis. In fact, while the novelty of the paper is that it integrates 
the study of the impact of MNEs on the institutional distance, to the study of informal institutions, we 
have adopted a country-level perspective.  The motivations of MNEs underlying the specific FDI 
initiative may lead to different types of partnerships with local communities and NGOs. In addition, it 
would be possible to study the impact that the internalization of societal failures, through the provision 
of electricity, has on firm performance.  
 Finally, our results have the potential to add to the current understanding of the role of private investment 
on development; however, it would be interesting to understand whether local vs. foreign MNEs  actually 
differ in their potential impact on the local context. 
The implementation of these ideas rank high in our research agenda. 
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 Tables 
 
Table 1. Options for electricity provision in developing countries under different combinations of 
formal and informal institutions 
 
    Formal Institutions 
    Strong Weak 
Informal 
Institutions 
Strong 
Electricity provided by governments (or 
regulated utilities), NGOs and electricity 
cooperatives through national grids, mini 
grids or off-grid systems 
Electricity provided by NGOs and electricity 
cooperatives) through off- or mini-grid 
systems  
Weak 
Electricity provided by the governments 
(or regulated utilities) through national or 
mini grids 
Electricity provided by MNEs through 
national grids or mini-grid systems 
     Sources: Authors’ analysis. 
 
  
 Table 2. Home and host country pairs in our dataset. 
Home countries Host countries 
Angola Israel Saudi Arabia South Africa 
Argentina Italy Seychelles Ghana 
Aruba Japan Singapore Mauritius 
Australia Kenya Slovenia Angola 
Austria Korea, Rep. South Africa Cameroon 
Bahamas, The Lebanon Spain Congo, Rep. 
Bahrain Liberia Sri Lanka Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Belgium Libya Swaziland Gabon 
Bermuda Liechtenstein Sweden Kenya 
Botswana Luxembourg Switzerland Uganda 
Brazil Madagascar Taiwan, China Eritrea 
Bulgaria Malawi Tanzania Ethiopia 
Canada Malaysia Thailand Botswana 
Cayman Islands Maldives Togo Namibia 
China Malta Turkey Nigeria 
Cote d'Ivoire Mauritius United Kingdom   
Cyprus Morocco United States   
Czech Republic Mozambique Uganda   
Denmark Namibia United Arab Emirates   
Finland Netherlands Uruguay   
France New Zealand Yemen, Rep.   
Germany Nigeria Zambia   
Ghana Norway Zimbabwe   
Greece Pakistan     
Hong Kong SAR, China Panama     
Hungary Paraguay     
Iceland Philippines     
India Poland     
Indonesia Portugal     
Ireland Russian Federation     
Source: Sample data from UNCTAD FDI Statistics Division on Investment and Enterprise 
(http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx) accessed on 15th June 2015. 
  
  
  
  
  
 Table 3. Access to electricity rate in sub-Saharan African host countries, 2005 and 2011. 
  
  2005 2011 
(Households) access to electricity  
(%) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 53 67 
Angola 15 38 
Botswana 39 46 
Cameroon 47 54 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6 9 
Congo, Rep. 20 37 
Eritrea 20 32 
Ethiopia 15 23 
Gabon 48 60 
Ghana 49 72 
Kenya 14 19 
Mauritius 94 99 
Namibia 34 60 
Nigeria 46 48 
South Africa 70 85 
Uganda 9 15 
Source: Sample data from International Energy Agency (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/) 
accessed on 24th May 2016 and authors’ calculation. 
 
  
 Table 4. Distribution of FDI per capita by region of origin. 
 
  
FDI per capita 
(US dollar) % 
Regions of Origin 
China (w/ Hong Kong) 18,684 6.60 
East Asia (w/o China &  Hong Kong) 4,222 1.50 
European Union 80,385 28.60 
India 7,916 2.80 
Latin America & Caribbean 20,713 7.40 
North Africa & Middle East 6,541 2.30 
North America 55,250 19.60 
Oceania 12,014 4.30 
Russia 153 0.10 
South East Asia 42,543 15.10 
South Asia (w/o India) 1,921 0.70 
Sub-Saharan Africa 30,923 11.00 
Total 281,264   
Source: Sample data from UNCTAD FDI Statistics Division on Investment and Enterprise 
(http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx) accessed on 15th March 2015 and authors’ calculation. 
  
  
  
  
 Table 5. Formal institutional voids: factor analysis results. 
 
 Formal Institutional Void 
Regulatory Quality 0.94 
Control of Corruption 0.94 
Governance Effectiveness 0.96 
Rule of Law 0.96 
Voice and Accountability 0.95 
Political Stability 0.82 
Note: N = 1547. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
 
  
 Table 6. Sample variables: descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (N=1 547). 
  
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Access to electricity 58.91 28.07 5.80 99.00 1 
                
(2) Population 29.21 24.55 1.20 160.00 -0.12* 1 
               
(3) Rural population 50.72 16.46 13.85 86.75 -0.42* 0.02 1 
              
(4) Population density 170.76 205.00 2.46 633.52 0.62* -0.47* 0.17* 1 
             
(5) Industry value added 32.79 13.74 10.39 77.41 -0.16* -0.27* -0.49* -0.28* 1 
            
(6) Services value added 55.23 14.12 18.91 70.94 0.63* 0.12* -0.02 0.40* -0.60* 1 
           
(7) LIC 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 -0.59* 0.21* 0.65* -0.17* -0.42* -0.29* 1 
          
(8) LMIC 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 -0.22* -0.22* -0.11* -0.19* 0.50* -0.54* -0.24* 1 
         
(9) FDI per capita 181.81 1496.38 0.04 39379.23 0.11* -0.12* 0.02 0.17* -0.02 0.07* -0.07* -0.01 1 
        
(10) Formal institutional voids 1.27 1.00 0.00 3.76 -0.78* 0.19* 0.26* -0.57* 0.34* -0.76* 0.46* 0.44* -0.10* 1 
       
(11) Informal institutional voids  
(Hofstede) 
38.67 21.12 15.00 65.00 0.34* 0.39* -0.45* -0.26* -0.03 0.56* -0.52* -0.35* -0.05* -0.51* 1 
      
(12) Informal institutional voids 
(individualism) 
0.53 0.30 0.00 0.85 0.15* 0.26* -0.57* -0.44* 0.38* 0.20* -0.67* 0.05* -0.05* -0.11* 0.79* 1 
     
(13) Informal institutional voids  
(distrust) 
1200.54 1087.68 0.00 2529.00 -0.17* -0.34* 0.62* 0.45* -0.27* -0.20* 0.56* 0.03 0.07* 0.24* -0.83* -0.83* 1 
    
(14) Formal institutional proximity 6.57 1.47 0.00 8.57 0.21* 0.11* -0.13* -0.03 -0.21* 0.23* -0.05* -0.17* -0.02 -0.32* 0.23* 0.05* -0.15* 1 
   
(15) Informal institutional proximity 
(Hofstede) 
2.75 0.92 0.00 4.45 -0.04* -0.19* 0.30* 0.24* -0.04 -0.03 0.07* 0.06* 0.02 0.07* -0.31* -0.24* 0.35* -0.03 1 
  
(16) Informal institutional proximity 
(individualism) 
4.88 1.36 0.00 6.71 -0.12* -0.22* 0.09* -0.02 0.21* -0.03 -0.21* 0.10* 0.07* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.07* -0.28* 0.11* 1 
 
(17) Informal institutional proximity 
(distrust) 
8.47 2.00 0.00 9.96 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.06* 0.01 -0.12* 0.06* 0.06* -0.03 0.10* -0.16* -0.11* 0.15* -0.11* -0.13* -0.09* 1 
Source: Authors' calculation. * p<0.10. 
 Table 7. System GMM Estimates. 
  Informal Institutional Void: Degree of Individualism Informal Institutional Void: Degree of Distrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Host Formal and 
Informal Institutional 
Void 
Formal Institutional 
Proximity 
Informal 
Institutional 
Proximity 
Host Formal and 
Informal Institutional 
Void 
Formal Institutional 
Proximity 
Informal 
Institutional 
Proximity 
Access to electricity t-1 -0.70*** -0.65*** -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.65*** -0.73*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Population t-1 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Rural population t-1 -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.25*** -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.55*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Population density t-1 0.04*** 0.033*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry value added t-1 -0.14 -0.14 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Services value added t-1 0.34*** 0.22** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.54*** 
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
LMIC -4.45* -4.1 -8.13*** 5.62*** 5.64*** 7.80*** 
  (2.61) (2.53) (2.59) (1.62) (1.64) (1.88) 
LIC  -24.55*** -21.32*** -27.89*** - - - 
  (4.37) (4.09) (4.08)       
FDI per capita t-1 -0.02** -0.03 0.04 -0.004 -0.05 -0.003 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.004) (0.04) (0.004) 
Formal institutional void t-1 0.08 -1.34 1.01 -3.50*** -3.96*** -2.92** 
  (1.33) (1.15) (1.51) (1.18) (1.26) (1.27) 
Informal institutional void -20.22*** -16.90*** -16.67*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (5.61) (5.02) (5.37) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Formal institutional void t-1 0.003 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Informal institutional void  0.02** -0.02 -0.01 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Formal institutional proximity t-1 - -0.02 - - -0.09 - 
    (0.4)     (0.4)   
FDI per capita t-1 * Formal institutional proximity t-1 - 0.01 - - 0.01 - 
    (0.01)     (0.01)   
Informal institutional proximity - - -3.58*** - - 0.04 
      (0.96)   - (0.23) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Informal institutional proximity - - -0.01 - - 0.001** 
      (0.01)     (0.001) 
Constant 56.02*** 55.72*** 61.58*** 37.76*** 38.34*** 30.34*** 
  (9.33) (10.14) (8.75) (7.88) (8.77) (8.74) 
Observations 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,105 
Number of pair countries 221 221 221 221 221 221 
AR(1) -5.64 -5.58 -5.72 -5.51 -5.57 -5.012 
AR(2) 0.63 1.1 0.63 1.2 1.23 0.46 
Wald test 220.39 220.71 216.59 221 220.91 218.81 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Notes: Dependent variable ∆Access to electricity. Two-step system-GMM. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  All AR(1) test statistics statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. All AR(2) test statistics 
statistically insignificant.  All Hansen test statistics statistically insignificant. *** Significant at 1 per cent level. ** Significant at 5 per cent level. * Significant at 10 per cent level. 
 Table 8. Access to electricity growth: Marginal effects of FDI per capita. 
    
Informal Institutional 
Voids: Degree of 
Individualism 
Informal Institutional Voids: 
Degree of Distrust 
Host Formal and Informal Institutional Void 
(H1) 
0.02* 0.02* 
(0.01) (0.11) 
Host Formal and Informal 
Institutional Voids 
(H2) 
Formal Institutional Proximity 
0.02* 0.04** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
Formal Institutional Distance 
-0.02 -0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Host Formal and Informal 
Institutional Voids 
(H2) 
Informal Institutional Proximity 
0.02** 70.95** 
(0.01) (32.08) 
Informal Institutional Distance 
0.07 0.01 
(0.04) (0.01) 
Two-step system GMM. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level. ** Significant at 5 per cent level. * Significant at 10 per cent level.  
 
 
  
 Table 9. Alternative measure of quality of informal institutions: System GMM Estimates 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Host Formal and 
Informal 
Institutional Void 
Formal 
Institutional 
Proximity 
Informal 
Institutional 
Proximity 
Access to electricity t-1 -0.71*** -0.79*** -0.71***  
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Population t-1 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.17***  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Rural population t-1 -0.39*** -0.45*** -0.39***  
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Population density t-1 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry value added t-1 -0.22** -0.04 -0.22**  
(0.11) (0.13) (0.10) 
Services value added t-1 0.18* 0.45*** 0.17*  
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10) 
LMIC -3.89 -2.14 -3.84  
(2.46) (3.08) (2.42) 
LIC -18.27*** -16.96*** -18.08***  
(3.51) (4.15) (3.49) 
FDI per capita t-1 -0.01 -0.02 0.001  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Formal institutional voids t-1 -4.24*** -4.37*** -4.16***  
(1.45) (1.64) (1.44) 
Informal institutional void -0.20** -0.27*** 0.19**  
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Formal institutional void t-1 0.01** 0.01* 0.01*  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Informal institutional void 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Formal institutional proximity t-1 
 
0.45 
 
  
(0.46) 
 
FDI per capita t-1 * Formal institutional proximity t-1 
 
0.001 
 
  
(0.003) 
 
Informal institutional proximity 
  
-0.30    
(0.55) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Informal institutional proximity 
  
-0.002    
(0.002) 
Constant 65.33*** 53.60*** 69.70***  
(9.92) (11.85) (9.70) 
Observations 1,326 1,105 1,326 
Number of pair countries 221 221 221 
AR(1) -5.42 -4.85 -5.41 
AR(2) 1.02 0.09 1.04 
Wald test 220.90 219.85 220.87 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Notes: Dependent variable ∆Access to electricity. Two-step system-GMM. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
           All AR(1) test statistics statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. All AR(2) test statistics statistically insignificant.  
           All Hansen test statistics statistically insignificant. 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level. ** Significant at 5 per cent level. * Significant at 10 per cent level. 
  
 Table 10. Alternative measure of quality of informal institutions: Marginal effects of FDI per capita. 
 
 
Host 
Formal and Informal 
Institutional Void 
Host Formal and Informal Institutional Voids Host Formal and Informal Institutional Voids 
Formal Institutional 
Proximity 
Formal Institutional 
Distance 
Informal Institutional 
Proximity 
Informal Institutional 
Distance 
0.02** 0.03** 0.02 0.02* 0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Two-step system GMM. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1 per cent level. ** Significant at 5 per cent level. * Significant at 10 per cent level.
 Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Formal institutional dimensions of the provision of electricity infrastructure 
 
WORLDWIDE 
GOVERNANCE 
INDICATORS (WGIS)A 
 
WGI DEFINITIONA FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONSB 
Government 
Effectiveness  
Quality of public and civil services and the degree 
of their independence from political pressures. 
Quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. 
 
Government's ability in 
directly providing electricity; 
Credibility of regulatory 
system. 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence and 
Terrorism 
  
Likelihood of political instability and/or politically 
motivated violence, including terrorism. 
 
Political stability. 
Voice and Accountability  Extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
a free media. 
 
Administrative capabilities of 
the country; Judicial 
independence and 
professionalism.   
 
Regulatory Quality Ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
 
Credibility of regulatory 
system. 
Control of Corruption Extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
 
Credibility of regulatory 
system; Judicial 
independence and 
professionalism. 
 
Rule of Law Extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence.  
Administrative capabilities of 
the country; Judicial 
independence and 
professionalism. 
Sources:  A Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)     
                   accessed on 13rd July 2015. 
                B Bergara et al., 1998. 
  
 
 
